In March 1864, President Lincoln promoted Grant to overall head of the Union army. the fact remains that Grant’s pugnacity fitted the general strategical situation—the conquest of the South, whilst Lee’s audacity more than once accelerated rather than retarded this object.” Ironically, the Overland Campaign of 1864, for which Grant’s war strategy is criticized as taking too many casualties, demonstrate s what Lee could have done had he stayed on the strategic and tactical defensive throughout the war. While Grant’s strategic vision was vitally important to victory, this paper concentrates on his operational, as opposed to tactical or strategic, innovation. Examples of these unexpected events were the initial Rebel breakout from Fort Donelson, the surprise Confederate attack on the first day at Shiloh, and Jubal Early’s 2nd Corps breaking free from the Grant-Lee deadlock in June 1864. Ulysses S. Grant was one of the greatest generals in American history. The South’s primary opportunity for success was to outlast Lincoln and the deep schisms among Northerners throughout the War made this a distinct possibility. The Marines identify tactics as the lowest level of war, beneath the strategic and the operational levels. Grant was ranked38th in 1994 and 1996, but ranked 21st in 2018. See for example, Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, Volume 3 (New York: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1945), 439. On the downside, Grant’s war strategy of aggressiveness caused him to focus so much on what he intended to do to the enemy that he at times became vulnerable to enemy surprises. The analyst said, “ . Group of answer choices A. He coordinated the strategy of the military, which was starting to close in on the Confederacy.Grant brought his western raiding tactics to the east, consciously developing a strategy of total war. Ulysses S. Grant, later to become the 18th president of the United States, commanded union forces during the civil war as a general and general in chief. Like Washington, Grant’s battlefield performance was the only factor standing between the United States continuing as one, indivisible nation. B. In Fuller's The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant, he thinks that Grant was not an innovator in tactics;* his skill was more in the operational and strategic sphere. Others have argued that Lee’s aggressiveness was compelled by Southerners’ expectations that he take the offensive. Ulysses S. Grant (1822 - 1885) was born in Ohio into Tanning/Farming family. More relevantly, the North had 4,070,000 men of fighting age (15 to 40), and the South had only 1,140,000 white men of fighting age. At the beginning of the conflict, veterans of the Mexican War, whose number included Grant, assumed conspicuous roles on both sides. Then too, the Union 9th Corps commander, operating directly under Grant’s orders, showed himself incapable of aggressive action. Grant's goal was the same as Lee's: get the men to where they can do the most good. While there could be little doubt of Grant’s intentions and objectives, Meade had the responsibility for tactical details.22, But the recent success at Missionary Ridge combined with intense political pressure to gain a victory over Lee affected Grant’s operational decisions. However, assisted by the efforts of Brigadier General William T. Sherman, who aggressively pushed forward men and equipment forward, the Union forces were quickly bolstered and provided Grant with a numerically superior army. … A fresh and comprehensive analysis of all the casualties (killed, wounded, and missing/captured) in all of Grant and Lee’s campaigns and battles reinforces the brilliance of Grant’s accomplishments. For example, he left Union lines to visit Commodore Foote, several miles away, without leaving a designated second-in-command; and he did not ensure that his right flank was set firmly against the Cumberland River, thereby permitting the Confederate cavalry under Forrest (and whomever chose to accompany them) to escape the Union encirclement. Assuming field command in the West when Halleck went to Washington as General-in-Chief, Grant maneuvered his subordinates in a way that should have resulted in the destruction of Earl Van Dorn’s Confederate army. American generals sought to grab territorial objectives in an effort to … The results of Lee’s faulty strategies and tactics were catastrophic. Should any officer, high or low, after the opportunity and experience we have had, be ignorant of his tactics, regulations, or even of the principles of the Art of War (Mahan and Jomini), it would be a lasting disgrace." On March 20, 1864, two of the Union's most celebrated generals, Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman, holed up in a parlor of the Burnet House, an elegant hotel at … These are strategy, operations and tactics. Grant, 276.
The record shows that Grant did precisely that, though his subordinates often failed to capitalize on his work. They all surrendered to Grant in an affirmation that, as Albert Castel said, “ . Rather, Grant ordered subordinates into action after learning the intentions of the Confederate forces. There is no evidence that Grant ever wanted to win the war by attrition as his mostly-Southern critics claim, nor is there any indication that Grant believed frontal attacks alone were the answer. By mid-June, Union soldiers had dug mines under the Confederate works. "tactics.". Grant was the keystone of Union victory, a man whose removal would have resulted in the Union cause crumbling into defeat – and the United States dissolving d. combined river and land attacks. While Grant’s strategic vision was vitally important to victory, this paper concentrates on his operational, as opposed to tactical or strategic, innovation. During the battle, the new general also displayed the personal bravery that marked his Mexican experiences, having one horse shot from under him and being the last to re-embark aboard the river transports that had carried his troops to the area.14 But the want of a reserve denied Grant tactical options; Belmont marked the last time he would enter a battle without one. He went to West Point in 1839, but with no military ambition. They caused destruction as they went undermining the Confederacy’s infrastructure and the morale of its citizens. Cleaves, Freeman. Rock of Chickamauga: The Life of George H. Thomas. 20 For an excellent account of the generalship of Jackson, see G.F.R. Undeterred, and with reinforcements sent to him from Helena, Arkansas and Memphis, Grant decided to besiege the city. His unexcelled Vicksburg Campaign into enemy territory where he was outnumbered marked the war’s turning point. He then calculated Grant’s losses between May 5, 1864, and April 9, 1865, as 15,139 killed, 77,748 wounded, and 31,503 missing or captured for a total of 124,390. Grant was a very good strategist whose rep was somewhat tarnished by his acceptance of the Lincoln-Halleck-Stanton attrition mandate on the Virginia Front. American Civil War: Ulysses Grant’s Unique Strategy to Capture Vicksburg. . On March 20, 1864, two of the Union's most celebrated generals, Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman, holed up in a parlor of the Burnet House, an elegant hotel at … .”. Generals acting the operational level of war, however, must rely on such occurrences. Amazingly, almost one-fourth of Southern white males of military age died during the war—virtually all of them from wounds or war-related diseases. If Lee had performed differently, the North could have been fatally split on the war issue, Democratic nominee George B. McClellan might have defeated Lincoln, and the South could have negotiated an acceptable settlement with the compromising McClellan. The record shows that Grant did precisely that, though his subordinates often failed to capitalize on his work. There's some discussion of Emery Upton on the tactical side too. They were the faces of the North and South. As such, it has not been reviewed for accuracy by the University and does not necessarily adhere to the University's scholarly standards. The tempo of operations from Ft. Henry through Ft. Donelson set a tone for Grant’s later actions. It was Lee’s strategy and tactics that dissipated irreplaceable manpower—even in his “victories.” His tactical losses at Seven Days’ (especially Malvern Hill), his strategic defeats at Antietam and Gettysburg, and his costly “wins” at Second Bull Run and Chancellorsville—all in 1862 and 1863—made possible Grant’s and Sherman’s successful 1864 campaigns against the armies defending Richmond and Atlanta and created the aura of Confederate defeat that Lincoln exploited to win reelection. In Mexico, the smaller American units routinely maneuvered aggressively, attacked and routed defending units who were in strong, fortified positions. But it was Grant who recovered the day and won the battle, notwithstanding the bravery and courage of thousands of his officers and men. 8 Even Major General George Meade is quoted with disparaging remarks about Grant’s appetite for bloody, frontal attacks. Get it as soon as Wed, Oct 7. . In the West, General Ulysses S. Grant employed the wise strategy of: a. guerrilla war tactics. Grant moved very quickly against the larger, better defended and more substantial fort - faster than his commander, Major General Henry Halleck, would have liked. The feasibility of such an outcome is demonstrated by the fact that, despite numerous crucial mistakes by Lee and others, the Confederates still appeared to have political victory in their grasp in the late summer of 1864, when Lincoln himself despaired of winning reelection that coming November. b. deceptive stalling tactics. Question 25 options: He continuously circled around General Robert E. Lee to keep him surrounded. The Union could achieve its aim only by destroying the will of the southern population through invasion and conquest. The Union army was encouraged to live off the land. The greatest assets that Ulysses S. Grant brought to the union forces were his incredible strategic mind, his determination, his willingness to fight and his ability to win. The Confederacy could achieve its aim simply by protecting itself sufficiently to remain in existence. As Alan Nolan argued, because the South was so badly outnumbered and the burden was on the North to win the war, Lee’s grand strategy should have been a defensive one that did not squander the scarce manpower of the Confederacy. They faced incessant Union operations that had Lee scrambling, unable to seize the initiative. Grant’s War Strategy That Made 3 Confederate Armies Surrender, California – Do not sell my personal information. OR, 17, pt. "Tactics" is defined in one dictionary as "the science and art of using a fighting force to the best advantage having regard to the immediate situation of combat. At Shiloh, 1862, Grant clearly wanted to stay at the operational level as seen in this order to Sherman on April 4, two days before the Confederate attack: "…Information just received would indicate that the enemy are sending in a force to Purdy, and it may be with a view to attack General Wallace at Crump's Landing. 128 vols. However, his career was far from a steady stream of success. Military strategic theory during the Civil War had scarcely advanced past that which was advocated by Napoleon, as interpreted by the Baron de Jomini. His popularity as a general propelled him to become president of the country he had helped preserve. It was Lee’s strategy and tactics that dissipated irreplaceable manpower—even in his “victories.” His army lost at Malvern Hill, Antietam, Gettysburg, the Shenandoah Valley, Petersburg, and Appomattox. As a matter of fact, Grant’s war strategy lost fewer men in his successful effort to take Richmond and end the war than his predecessors lost in making the same attempt and failing.” Dana examined the specific casualties suffered by Union troops in the East under Grant’s predecessors and then under Grant. When the Southerners attacked, Sherman was completely surprised, though he and most others fought back with savage fury. Had Lee not squandered Rebel resources during the three preceding years, the Confederacy’s 1864 opportunity for victory might have been realized. Bevin Alexander compared Lee unfavorably to Jackson on the issue of over aggressiveness: “Jackson was a military genius. Although responsibility for the Union failures was Grant’s, the primary reason for the failures was weak subordinate leadership. 4.8 out of 5 stars 87. In Fuller's The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant, he thinks that Grant was not an innovator in tactics;* his skill was more in the operational and strategic sphere. But none of the tactical innovations had nearly the effect on future wars as two of Grant’s innovations – innovations as surely credited to Grant as greatness is to Robert E. Lee. Grant, U.S. Memoirs and Selected Letters. Grant evolved as a leader as the war progressed, and he achieved a degree of strategic and operational competence unmatched by any other Civil War general. McWhiney, Grady and Jamieson, Perry D. Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage. As the first respondent stated, Grant's strategy was to keep pressing the enemy. The press and the populace did not only desire a decisive victory over Lee, but they was expected it.23. He coordinated the strategy of the military, which was starting to close in on the Confederacy.Grant brought his western raiding tactics to the east, consciously developing a strategy of total war. Jackson generally had fewer than 20,000 troops and faced a single, poorly-led opponent of about equal strength. The campaign for Vicksburg was the war’s foremost example of maneuver warfare, and the tempo of operations maintained by Grant’s forces from May until July, 1863, was never again matched during the Civil War. His own subordinates, William "Baldy" Smith and Winfield Scott Hancock, utterly lost their nerve in the face of a strong defensive position, even though very few Southern infantry occupied it! 98. But total warfare was more a strategic than operational change. Grant starte… . New York: The Library of America, 1990. There would be no turning back this time. Second, Grant recognized that a high tempo of operations reduced or eliminated the enemy’s ability to use advantages such as interior lines of communications. Grant and Lee by Mackubin T. Owens The conventional wisdom concerning the comparative generalship of Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant was established almost immediately after the War of the Rebellion. Grant fully utilized his senior subordinates to implement tactics while preserving for himself an operational role. . In deciding, Grant made two of the key judgments of the war - he retained Major General George G. Meade as commander of the Union Army of the Potomac and he kept Halleck as Chief of Staff in Washington, leaving to Halleck the burden of daily supervision of the Army headquarters. Until 1864, wars were conducted when the seasons best permitted, or when men could be away from their farms. Grant launched major assaults against Pemberton on May 19 and 22 and was repulsed with heavy casualties each time. These decisions freed Grant of two momentous problems – naming a new commander for one of his important filed armies and assuming daily responsibility for the entire army himself. Hardcover $44.98 $ 44. 26 For an in-depth view of the tactical responsibilities of Longstreet at Chickamauga and The Wilderness, see, for example, Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet, The Confederacy’s Most Controversial Soldier (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 306-22; 378-92. This appears to have been innately learned, since Grant denies having read the standard books on tactics11 or the military pronouncements of the French general, Henri Jomini, or the American Thomas Mahan, whose tactical doctrine dominated Civil War thinking.12. Therefore, at dawn, Grant attacked (increasing the tempo) before the Confederates could renew their assaults. C. Grant preferred measured tactics like dividing his army while Lee tended to whip his troops into a frenzy. Grant focused on number of casualties while Lee focused on territory gained. We could not hope to conquer her. A Southern victory was not out of the question. Grant favored defensive tactics while Lee relied on relentless offensive to win battles. First, Grant understood that war could not be a seasonal activity. . FREE Shipping by Amazon . The capture of Ft. Henry, February 1862, first brought fame to Grant, although it was the Navy who won the battle before Grant’s army troops could get into action. 12 If Grant did not believe in reading about military doctrine, his most trusted subordinate, Major General W.T. The ensuing operations were even more commendable when it is considered that Grant’s plan did not have the support of his primary lieutenant and confidant, William T. Sherman. The Battle of Monocacy: Reflections on Battle, Contingency, and Strategy. His tactical plan was neither complex nor imaginative. For an excellent account of Chancellorsville see Ernest B. Furgurson, Chancellorsville 1863: The Souls of the Brave (New York,: Random House, 1993). 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